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A B S T R A C T
The scientific study of animal affect (emotion) is an area of growing interest. Whilst research on mechanism and
causation has predominated, the study of function is less advanced. This is not due to a lack of hypotheses; in
both humans and animals, affective states are frequently proposed to play a pivotal role in coordinating adaptive
responses and decisions. However, exactly how they might do this (what processes might implement this
function) is often left rather vague. Here we propose a framework for integrating animal affect and decision-
making that is couched in modern decision theory and employs an operational definition that aligns with di-
mensional concepts of core affect and renders animal affect empirically tractable. We develop a model of how
core affect, including short-term (emotion-like) and longer-term (mood-like) states, influence decision-making
via processes that we label affective options, affective predictions, and affective outcomes and which correspond
to similar concepts in schema of the links between human emotion and decision-making. Our framework is
generalisable across species and generates questions for future research.
1. Introduction
The concept of animal emotion has a turbulent history in biology
spanning from Darwin’s (1872) ready acceptance that non-human an-
imals (hereafter animals) have emotional states of mind, through ob-
jections that such internal states are not accessible to scientific study
(Skinner, 1953; Tinbergen, 1951), to the recent resurgence of interest in
animal emotion in neuroscience, psychopharmacology, and animal
welfare science (Adolphs and Anderson, 2018; Bach and Dayan, 2017;
Dawkins, 2000; de Waal, 2011; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Paul
et al., 2005; Rolls, 2005). Current interest is so wide that it even
stretches to journals whose traditional focus is on cellular and mole-
cular biology (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; LeDoux et al., 2016), and
to discussions about the possibility of insect emotion (Baracchi et al.,
2017; Mendl et al., 2011; Mendl and Paul, 2016; Perry and Baciadonna,
2017).
The types of research question that are asked about animal emotion
can be usefully organised according to the ‘Four Whys’ framework for
studying animal behaviour advocated by the ethologist, Niko Tinbergen
(Bateson and Laland, 2013; Mobbs et al., 2018; Tinbergen, 1963)1 .
Proximate questions about cause and, to a lesser extent, development
have dominated, as in affective neuroscience which seeks to understand
the neural substrates of emotion (Adolphs and Anderson, 2018;
Cardinal et al., 2002; Dalgleish, 2004; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998;
Rolls, 2005), and psychopharmacology which addresses the interplay
between drugs, emotions, and other psychological states (Cryan et al.,
2002, 2005; Everitt et al., 2018; Prut and Belzung, 2003). Ultimate
questions about function and evolution have received less attention. One
set of functions frequently attributed to human emotion is to coordinate
or organise adaptive responses and decisions. For example, emotions
“…function within individuals in the control of goal priorities” (Oatley
and Jenkins, 1992); emotional experience “…serves as data for judg-
ment and decision-making processes and also for reordering processing
priorities” (Clore, 1994); “emotion…can be regarded as the primary
source of decisions and, thus, control of behaviour” (Frijda, 1994);
“emotions are a major factor in the interaction between environmental
conditions and human decision processes” (Bechara and Damasio,
2005); “emotions play complex roles in economic decision-making”
(Dunning et al., 2017; see also: Levenson, 1994; Loewenstein et al.,
2001; Mellers et al., 1999; Scherer, 1994).
This putative interplay between emotion and adaptive decision-
making / behaviour control combines questions about mechanism and
function and is also emphasised by researchers working with animals.
“Pleasure serves as the common currency in the tradeoffs between
clashing motivations” (Cabanac, 1992); emotions “…gear a particular
type of motivational control to the perception of critical circumstances”
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and “constrain decision-making” (Aureli and Whiten, 2003); emotions
are “mental and bodily states that potentiate behaviour appropriate to
environmental challenges” (de Waal, 2011; see also: Broom, 1998;
LeDoux, 2012b; Mendl et al., 2010; Nesse, 2000; Panksepp, 2011; Rolls,
2014). Despite an apparent consensus that an important function of
animal emotion, like human emotion, is to coordinate or organise de-
cisions and behavioural control, it is often not made clear what ‘co-
ordinating’ and ‘organising’ actually involve, and the exact role that
animal emotion plays.
In human research, theory and empirical findings have generated
more detailed descriptions of the coordinating and organising role of
emotions in decision-making. Many of these are captured in
Loewenstein & Lerner’s (2003) affect and decision-making schema
which is summarised in Fig. 1. Humans are predicted to make decisions
and select behaviours based on the expected emotions that they anticipate
will occur following the expected consequences of their decisions
(Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; also ‘somatic markers’, ‘affective fore-
casting’, ‘subjective expected pleasure’, ‘affect heuristic’: Bechara and
Damasio, 2005; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Mellers et al., 1999; Slovic
et al., 2007; Wilson and Gilbert, 2005). Contemplation of potential
decision outcomes and their associated expected emotions act as an-
ticipatory influences which generate an individual’s immediate emotions
during decision-making, for example by inducing ‘anxiety’ if negative
or uncertain outcomes are envisaged. Similarly, Knutson and Greer
(2008) propose that anticipation of decision outcomes generates what
they term anticipatory affect during decision-making, and Bechara and
Damasio (2005) suggest that somatic markers of the prospective decision
outcome are registered whilst a decision is being made. These markers
(changes in bodily physiological and behavioural states (components of
emotion)) are hypothesised to signal the consequences of actions in the
decision context, and hence to guide decisions. However, Dunning et al.
(2017) suggest that immediate emotions are generated partly through
contemplation of the action to be taken per se (action-related emotions),
irrespective of any prospective decision outcome.
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) propose that both immediate and
expected emotions combine to influence the decision taken. For ex-
ample, current anxiety coupled with a negative expected emotion
would predispose caution or avoidance. Immediate emotions are also
moderated by incidental influences such as moods and background so-
matic states; a sunny day may generate a happy mood and alter im-
mediate emotions with knock-on effects for decisions (Loewenstein and
Lerner, 2003; see also: Clore and Tamir, 2002; Clore, 1992; Dunning
et al., 2017; Mathews and MacLeod, 1994; Mineka et al., 1998; Mogg
and Bradley, 2005; Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Slovic et al., 2007). Re-
cursively, immediate emotions can also have indirect effects on ex-
pected decision outcomes and expected emotions (Loewenstein and
Lerner, 2003).
This human-based schema can provide a useful start-point for
framing research on animal affect and decision-making. However, it
raises a number of theoretical and empirical questions. How are the
concepts of immediate emotion, expected emotion and mood related?
Can we operationalise them in such a way that allows us to study them
empirically in animals? How exactly might they interact with each
other and alter decisions? Does this require a ‘common currency’ system
and, if so, what might this be? What happens following a decision and
how does this affect subsequent ones?
We suggest that a conceptual framework that offers answers to these
questions can help to structure the study of animal affect and decision-
making and provide hypotheses that can be tested experimentally. Steps
in this direction have been taken by, amongst others, Mendl et al.
(2010); Nettle and Bateson (2012); Bach and Dayan (2017); Gygax
(2017), and Burghardt (2019). Here we explore this issue in depth by
developing a framework that is explicitly couched in terms of modern
decision theory, employs an operational definition that renders animal
emotion empirically tractable and can be applied across species, shows
how this definition readily aligns with prominent dimensional concepts
of emotion, and uses principles from reinforcement learning theory to
provide a model of the links between animal affect and decision-
making. We start by defining our use of terms and, after developing our
model, end by considering implications, elaborations, caveats, and
questions for future research.
2. Terminology: ‘emotion’, ‘mood’, ‘affect’, ‘core affect’ and
‘feelings’
So far we have used emotion words rather colloquially to introduce
the research topic. However, it is important to be clear about termi-
nology in this area because, despite growing interest in ‘animal emo-
tion’, differing viewpoints about what we actually mean by the term
lead to confusion about how to identify, measure, and study it, and how
to interpret findings (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; Baracchi et al.,
2017; Dawkins, 2015; de Vere and Kuczaj, 2016; de Waal, 2011;
LeDoux, 2012b, 2014, 2017; Panksepp, 2005). Similar debates about
the definition, causation and nature of emotion are also evident in
human research (Adolphs, 2017; Barrett, 2012, 2017b; Dixon, 2012;
LeDoux, 2012a; Moors et al., 2013; Mulligan and Scherer, 2012; Rolls,
2013; Russell, 2012; Scarantino, 2012; Tracy, 2014). In order to avoid
confusion about what is implied by different words, we now clarify how
we will use certain terms in this article (see Table 1).
Key points, elaborated in Table 1, include that ‘emotion’ and ‘mood’
act as umbrella terms for a set of human subjective states comprising
sub-categories that we label with emotion-words such as ‘happiness’,
Fig. 1. Loewenstein & Lerner’s (2003) emotion and decision-making schema. When faced with a decision, contemplation of expected decision consequences (1) and
the resulting expected emotions (2) generates anticipatory influences that influence immediate emotions (3). Immediate emotions are also affected by incidental influences
(4) such as moods and other aspects of the decision scenario. Both immediate emotions (5) and expected emotions (6) influence the decision made, and hence
predicted decision outcomes (7) and associated emotional states (8).
Adapted from Loewenstein and Lerner (2003). See text for details.
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‘fear’, ‘elation’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘depression’. ‘Emotion’ refers to short-term
event- or object-focused states and ‘mood’ to longer-term free-floating
states. A shared and defining characteristic of these states is that they
are valenced – perceived as pleasant or unpleasant, positive or negative,
rewarding or punishing (Carver, 2001; Posner et al., 2005; Russell,
2003; Watson et al., 1999). An over-arching term for valenced states is
affect and therefore emotions and moods are examples of affective states.
Affective states also include the valenced component of sensations such
as the unpleasantness of pain or a bitter taste, as opposed to the sensory
component of sensations such as the specific (non-valenced) taste of a
bitter substance generated by dedicated sensory apparatus (Rolls,
2005).
Human affective states are given linguistic labels (‘happiness’, ‘sad-
ness’ etc.) which imply consciously experienced phenomena or ‘feelings’.
However, we cannot be certain that non-human animals share similar
states, experience them subjectively, or even have the capacity for
conscious experience (Boly et al., 2013; Dawkins, 2015, 2017; Edelman
and Seth, 2009; LeDoux, 2017; LeDoux and Brown, 2017; Paul et al.,
2020; Wynne, 2004). Contemporary psychologists take a componential
view of emotion or affect (Bradley and Lang, 2000; Clore and Ortony,
2000; Frijda, 1986; Panksepp, 2003; Scherer, 1984, 2005) acknowl-
edging that subjective feelings are accompanied by behavioural, phy-
siological and neural changes and that, in some cases, human affective
states may actually be unconscious (e.g. relevant behavioural responses
unaccompanied by reported feelings: Smith and Lane, 2015, 2016;
Winkielman and Berridge, 2004; Winkielman et al., 2005). Translating
this approach to animals allows us to study measurable behavioural,
physiological and neural components of affective states in the absence
of knowledge about subjective experience.
However, there is concern about translating emotion-words to ani-
mals because lay-usage can contaminate technical usage leading to
confusion about whether consciousness is implied or not. LeDoux
(2017) for example, advocates only using these words to denote con-
scious feelings, and using terms such as ‘defensive survival circuits’ to
describe exactly what is being studied in animals. We employ a slightly
different approach. When using ‘emotion’ and emotion-words (e.g.
anger) or ‘mood’ and mood-words (e.g. depression) with reference to
animals, we add the suffix ‘-like’ to indicate agnosticism about the
conscious component of these states (cf. ‘episodic-like memory’ in
animals; Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). However we use terms such as
‘affect’, ‘affective state’, ‘valence’ and ‘core affect’, which have a more
technical than colloquial provenance, in the same way when referring
to animals and humans, but without implying conscious experience in
animals (see Table 1 for full details).
3. An operational definition of animal affect
Given the potential for confusion about ideas and terminology in
this area, animal emotion research will benefit from a clear operational
definition that can provide a foundation for experimental investigations
in non-human species (see Paul and Mendl, 2018). The definition
should capture the defining characteristic of affective states which is
that they are valenced. To this end, we build on reinforcement-based
concepts of emotion from 20th century experimental psychology (Corr,
2008; Corr and McNaughton, 2012; Gray, 1975, 1987; McNaughton
and Corr, 2003; Millenson, 1967; Mowrer, 1960; Thorndike, 1911) and
draw on Rolls’ (2005) definition of emotions as ‘states elicited by re-
wards and punishers’ to produce the following definition which is op-
erationalised by defining rewards and punishments in behavioural
terms (Rolls, 2005, 2014; see also: Leknes and Tracey, 2008; Seymour
et al., 2007).
Animal affective states are elicited by rewards and punishers or their
predictors. A reward is anything for which an animal will work, and a
punisher is anything that it will work to escape or avoid. Rewards or the
absence of punishers, and associated predictions thereof, induce positive
affect. Punishers or the absence of rewards, and associated predictions
thereof, induce negative affect. Short-term emotion-like states follow im-
mediately from individual rewarding or punishing events, whilst cumulative
experience of events influences longer-term mood-like states.
The definition identifies four fundamental affective states: positive
states generated by (i) a reward or its predictors or (ii) termination or
omission of an anticipated punishment; negative states generated by
(iii) a punishment or its predictors or (iv) termination or omission of
anticipated reward. Indeed, when people anticipate or gain access to
objects or events that they want, or avoid those that they don’t want
(and are anticipating), they usually experience short-term positive af-
fect (e.g. ‘excitement’ or ‘joy’, and ‘relief’ respectively), and when they






We use these phrases to denote research areas and fields of study.
‘Affect’, ‘valence’ and related terms We use ‘affect’ as an overarching term for states that have the property of valence (they are positive or negative, rewarding
or punishing, pleasant or unpleasant etc.). Affective states include both emotions and moods (see below) but also the
valenced component of sensations (e.g. the unpleasantness of pain). They are usually considered to be consciously
experienced given their provenance in studies of reported subjective feelings. Nevertheless, affective states also have non-
conscious components (e.g. behavioural indicators; neural changes), and because the term ‘affect’ has a more technical
rather than colloquial usage, it is less likely to be interpreted as necessarily implying conscious experience.
For these reasons, when referring to animals we use the terms ‘affective state’, ‘affect’ and ‘valenced state’ in the same way
as for humans, but without implying conscious experience.
‘Emotion’ and emotion- words (e.g. ‘fear’, ‘anger’,
‘happiness)
Following convention in the human psychology literature, we use these terms to refer to short-term valenced states induced
by a specific event or object.
When referring to animals, we add the suffix ‘-like’ (e.g. ‘emotion-like’, ‘fear-like’) to indicate agnosticism about the
conscious component of an emotion (cf. ‘episodic-like memory’, Clayton and Dickinson, 1998).
‘Mood’ and mood-words (e.g. ‘depression’) Following convention in the human psychology literature, we use this term to refer to longer-term ‘free-floating’ valenced
states not associated with particular events or objects.
When referring to animals, we add the suffix ‘-like’ (e.g. ‘mood-like’) to indicate agnosticism about the conscious
component of a mood (cf. ‘episodic-like memory’, Clayton and Dickinson, 1998).
‘Core affect’ and related terms ‘Core affect’ refers to a conceptual model of human self-reported emotions that identifies valence and also arousal (how
activated or energised the individual is) as the key underlying dimensions of affective states. ‘Core affect space’ is defined by
these dimensions.
When referring to animals, we use the terms ‘core affect’, ‘valence’ and ‘arousal’ in the same way as for humans, but
without implying conscious experience.
‘Feelings’ We use this term when specifically referring to the conscious experience of affective states including emotions, moods, and
sensations.
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fail to obtain those that they want (and are anticipating), they experi-
ence short-term negative affect (e.g. ‘anxiety’ or ‘fear’ and ‘dis-
appointment’ respectively) (Camille et al., 2004; Carver, 2001; Leknes
and Tracey, 2008; Mellers et al., 1999; Mellers, 2000; Seymour et al.,
2005; Watson and Tellegen, 1985; Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Further-
more, the repeated experience of, for example, stimuli or events that
people seek to avoid can generate longer-term negative mood states
such as depression and other forms of emotional distress (Hammen,
2005; Kessler, 1997; Schilling et al., 2007; Turner and Lloyd, 1995).
We know that there are many stimuli or resources (usually bene-
ficial or harmful (e.g. food, mates, shelter, predators)) that non-human
animals will work to acquire or avoid (Dawkins, 1990), and we can
therefore point to one major set of instances in which affective states
arise in animals; that is when these things (rewards or punishers) are
acquired or not acquired, avoided or not avoided. According to our
definition, short-term emotion-like states occur in these circumstances.
Animals don’t just work to acquire or avoid biologically salient
stimuli, they will also work to access or avoid stimuli that predict these
things. For example, the phenomenon of second-order conditioning
demonstrates that animals will work to access a cue that predicts a first-
order cue that predicts a biologically salient stimulus (e.g. Gilboa et al.,
2014). This indicates that the first-order cue is itself rewarding and so,
following our definition, can induce short-term affect. A second set of
instances when short-term emotion-like states occur in animals is,
therefore, in response to predictors of rewards and punishers.
As well as working for short-term stimuli or instantaneous reward,
animals also work or show preferences for environments that they have
experienced over a longer time period. For example, they exhibit con-
ditioned-place preference for, or avoidance of, environments in which
they have, over the course of minutes to hours, experienced the effects
of a drug, or mild threat, or social contact (e.g. Tzschentke, 2007). They
also show preferences for and work harder to access some environments
in which they have lived for periods of days to weeks, compared to
others (Mason et al., 2001; Nicol et al., 2009). In line with our opera-
tional definition, working to access or avoid these environments can be
taken as evidence of longer-term ‘mood-like’ states generated by cu-
mulative experience of rewarding or punishing events in the environ-
ments. This would be most convincingly demonstrated if, for example,
an environment characterised by a high ratio of rewarding:punishing
events is worked for more strongly than one characterised by a lower
ratio, indicating that animals are working for / preferring an emergent
property of the environment rather than individual events per se. We
would also expect that preferences / work would alter over time as the
characteristics of environments changed (e.g. punishers became more
or less frequent). Unfortunately, there is a paucity of such data, but
there are new methods that may help us measure longer-term mood-like
states which we discuss in Sections 6.5 and 6.6.
Our operational definition is thus useful in a number of ways. It
incorporates the notion that valence is the defining feature of affective
states. Its behavioural grounding allows animal affect to be studied
empirically; rewards and punishers can be identified experimentally
and then used to induce positive or negative valence, thus providing a
‘ground-truth’ for the animal’s affective state. It identifies four types of
affective state that can occur in at least three temporal contexts; in
response to immediate reward or punishment, in response to predictors
of reward and punishment, and across longer time scales divorced from
specific events.
If we assume that rewards enhance survival and punishers threaten
survival, the approach provides an evolutionary framing that focuses on
two major imperatives likely to be evident in most animal species –
acquiring resources for and avoiding threats to survival and reproduc-
tion. It can thus be readily generalised across taxa. Moreover, the de-
finition allows affect to be studied independently of the question of
consciousness (cf. Dawkins, 2015, 2017). Affective states, as defined,
need not be consciously experienced in other species. Rather, they can
be thought of as being implemented in the nervous system and forming
the evolutionary roots of conscious emotion that has evolved in humans
and probably other species too. Separate empirical, theoretical and
philosophical studies of animal consciousness (Boly et al., 2013;
Edelman et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Paul et al., 2020; Seth
et al., 2005; Wemelsfelder, 2001; Wynne, 2004) are required to es-
tablish which species may share this conscious experience. Despite the
utility of the definition, it inevitably has limitations which we discuss in
Section 6.1.
4. Mapping the definition to dimensional models of emotion
Dimensional models of human affective states posit that felt emotions
and moods can be explained by the interplay between two or three
underlying neurobehavioural systems or dimensions. The notion of
valence (positivity vs negativity) is at the heart of these models. For
example, a prominent model is that of core affect (Posner et al., 2005;
Russell, 2003) in which the dimensions and associated systems are
valence and arousal. Related theories propose that key dimensions re-
flect the activity of neurobehavioural systems concerned with Reward
Acquisition (RAS) and Punishment Avoidance (PAS) (Carver, 2001; Corr,
2008; Higgins, 1998; Norris et al., 2010; Watson and Tellegen, 1985;
Watson et al., 1999). These two types of model have been combined by
conceptualising RAS and PAS as lying at 45° to the core affect axes
(Burgdorf and Panksepp, 2006; Carver, 2001; Knutson and Greer, 2008;
Mendl et al., 2010; Russell and Barrett, 1999; Yik et al., 1999; Fig. 2).
In Fig. 2 we show how the four fundamental affective states of our
operational definition map closely to locations in ‘core affect’ space.
The arrival of rewards or their predictors immediately generates a
transient increase in RAS activity leading to a REW-H (‘high-reward’)
state (green circle in Fig. 2A), whilst absence of, or failure to obtain,
expected rewards generates a transient decrease in RAS activity and
associated REW-L (‘low-reward’) state. Likewise, punishment or its
prediction transiently increases PAS activity resulting in a PUN-H state,
and omission or successful avoidance of an anticipated punishment
decreases PAS activity generating a transient PUN-L state. Activation of
either system is associated with an increase in arousal that prepares the
organism for (vigorous and imperative) action to acquire the reward or
avoid the punisher (Bach and Dayan, 2017; Boureau and Dayan, 2011;
Carver, 2001; Trimmer et al., 2013). Valence is dependent on which
system is activated or deactivated (high RAS activity and/or low PAS
activity for positive valence, and vice versa for negative valence: Carver,
2001; Higgins, 1998). We suggest that these short-term transient
changes in system activity correspond to emotion-like states.
An individual’s history of activation or deactivation of RAS and PAS
is likely to influence the baseline or ‘resting’ activity of these neuro-
behavioural systems which can be likened to a background ‘free-
floating’ mood-like state. Thus, we propose that mood-like states reflect
some cumulative function of prior short-term RAS and PAS emotion-
like states, which is likely discounted with time (cf. Bach and Dayan,
2017; Eldar et al., 2016; Gygax, 2017; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and
Bateson, 2012). These are depicted in Fig. 2B as two clouds of red
points that can be likened to a sampling distribution in memory (cf.
Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996) made up of past affective outcomes of
decisions weighted by their frequency of occurrence and recency. In
this case, the individual has experienced many punishing events (PUN-
H) and a fair number of events in which it failed to acquire rewards
(REW-L). Theoretically, RAS and PAS may operate independently
(Carver, 2001; Norris et al., 2010) or interact, including via mutual
inhibition, to generate a higher-level bipolar dimension (Leknes and
Tracey, 2008; Tellegen et al., 1999). Accordingly, we represent their
interplay as generating competing areas of activity in core affect space
and/or combining to influence a single location (cloud of grey points in
Fig. 2B) and discuss this further in Section 6.7.
Neural structures associated with reward acquisition (RAS) include
mesolimbic dopaminergic and opioidergic circuits, (medial) orbito-
frontal cortex, nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum, and those
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associated with punishment avoidance (PAS) include serotonergic cir-
cuits, (lateral) orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, anterior insula, and lat-
eral habenula (Berridge, 2003; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013, 2015;
Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cardinal et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2012;
Knutson and Greer, 2008; Leknes and Tracey, 2008; Norris et al., 2010;
Redish, 2015; Robbins and Everitt, 1996; Rolls, 2005; Schultz et al.,
1997; Seymour et al., 2007). For example, the midbrain dopamine
system is a candidate RAS with individual experiences of reward and its
prediction generating transient phasic responses, and tonic activity
potentially reflecting average reward rate, whilst a PAS role for the
serotonergic system has also been proposed, but evidence for this is
weaker (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2007; Dayan and Huys,
2008, 2009; Niv et al., 2007; but see: Daw et al., 2002; Leknes and
Tracey, 2008). We should note that some, perhaps many, brain areas
may be associated with both reward and punishment processing (Cohen
et al., 2015; Hamann and Mao, 2002; Kim et al., 2016; Leknes and
Tracey, 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012; Sergerie et al., 2008), and there is
even evidence for flexibility within a brain area across time and context
(Berridge, 2019; Reynolds and Berridge, 2008). The notion that tonic
activity in relevant circuits provides information about past experience
is similar to Roll’s (2005) suggestion that mood states reflect re-
verberation or ‘carry-over’ activity in relevant reward or punishment
circuits.
The dimensional ‘four affective state’ model illustrated in Fig. 2 can
be thought of as a set of building blocks from which more complex
emotion-like states can be constructed. For example, it has been argued
that the same basic state generated by different stimuli (e.g. acquisition
of food or sexual reward) is likely to be differentiated according to the
different sensory and contextual properties of the stimuli (Rolls, 2005).
Constructionist accounts of the generation of conscious emotions in
humans make a similar argument positing that core affect combines
with cognitive representations of other features of the ongoing situation
and past experience, to generate a potentially limitless set of emotions
(Barrett, 2017a, b). Such accounts can also be translated to animals
(Bliss-Moreau, 2017). For example, in ‘cognitively sophisticated’ spe-
cies core affect may be coloured by the influence of detailed social
knowledge about the eliciting situation to generate ‘grief-like’ (ele-
phants: Douglas-Hamilton et al., 2006) or ‘envy-like’ states (inequity-
aversion in non-human primates: Brosnan and de Waal, 2003). A dif-
ferent view is that discrete emotion-like states (e.g. ‘fear-like’, ‘happy-
like’) are generated fully-formed by the activation of independent
neurobehavioural systems (e.g. ‘FEAR system’, ‘PLAY system’:
Panksepp, 1998, 2005). In Section 6.2, we discuss how this discrete
emotion model may be incorporated into our framework.
5. Integrating animal affect and decision-making theory: a model
Combining our operational definition with dimensional models of
emotion generates a scientifically tractable approach to studying an-
imal affect. In particular, it provides an empirical way of specifying an
animal’s location in core affect space. For example, presenting the an-
imal with a known reward is assumed to generate a REW-H state, whilst
removing a known punisher generates a PUN-L state. This allows sys-
tematic investigation of core affect states in animals, including how
they affect decision-making, whilst leaving the question of whether
these states are consciously experienced to be addressed separately.
As we now discuss, the operational definition also dovetails with
principles of modern decision theory. This enables us to incorporate the
concept of core affect into decision-theoretical accounts of how actions
are selected and hence decisions are made. In doing so, we build on past
proposals in psychology and behavioural economics for how felt emo-
tions influence human decisions, and our own previous work hy-
pothesising that mood-like core affect states aid adaptive decision-
making (Mendl et al., 2010; see also: Gygax, 2017; Nettle and Bateson,
2012). We take, as our foundation, principles of Bayesian decision
theory and reinforcement learning theory, acknowledging that
Fig. 2. Core affect dimensional model of emotion. Putative Reward Acquisition (RAS) and Punishment Avoidance (PAS) Systems superimposed on the dimen-
sional core affect model. Four fundamental core affect states (REW-H (High-Reward); REW-L (Low-Reward); PUN-H (High-Punishment); PUN-L (Low-Punishment))
are predicted by an operational definition of animal affect and map on to the quadrants of core affect space. They are associated with the activation (or low activation
threshold) or deactivation (or high activation threshold) of RAS and PAS whose activity lies at 45° to the core affect axes. (A) The green circle depicts a transient core
affect response (RAS activation) to a rewarding event – a short-term emotion-like state. (B) Red circles represent hypothetical (in this case, negatively-valenced)
baseline activation of systems (or inverse activation thresholds) reflecting the individual’s history of reward and punishment and associated short-term emotion-like
states of the sort shown in (A). Circle size reflects cumulative frequency, duration or intensity of rewarding or punishing experience (discounted with time) and hence
the ‘weight of evidence’ for a particular state which may be coded as a sampling distribution in memory (cf. Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996). RAS and PAS can have both
negatively valenced (left half of core affect space) and positively valenced (right half of core affect space) states. The grey circle indicates a resulting hypothetical
integrated location in core affect space.
Adapted from Russell (2003); Panksepp & Burgdorf (2006); Knutson and Greer, (2008); Mendl et al. (2010). See text for details.
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decisions can involve both Pavlovian and instrumental processes and
can be effected by both model-free and model-based behavioural con-
trol (Dayan and Berridge, 2014). We demonstrate that affective states
may influence the decisions of animals in a number of ways depending
on the nature of the decision problem (high or low levels of ambiguity
or uncertainty) and the behavioural controller(s) employed. We thus
propose a descriptive model of the interplay between affect and deci-
sion-making that precisely describes hypothesised actions of short- and
long-term affective states before, during and after decisions.
5.1. Basic principles of decision theory
Situations, actions, value and the decision problem: Bayesian decision
theory proposes that an individual carries (neural) representations of
situations of the world where a situation comprises the animal’s own
state (behavioural, physiological etc.) and that of its environment
(Redish, 2015). The individual also represents a probability distribution
of future situations, has a set of actions that it can take, and each action
has a value in each situation – more beneficial actions have higher
value. The decision problem is to select the action which maximises
value in the current situation by leading to the most beneficial future
situations. Although actions are usually thought of as being directed
externally at the animal’s environment, they can also include internally-
directed choices such as whether and how to deploy attention and
working memory (Dayan, 2012). Reinforcement learning (RL) theory
offers a set of principles for solving the decision problem (Averbeck and
Costa, 2017; Bach and Dayan, 2017; Dayan, 2012; Dayan and Berridge,
2014; Huys et al., 2011; Rangel et al., 2008; Redish, 2015; Sutton and
Barto, 1998).
Pavlovian and instrumental RL: Instrumental RL allows selection of
arbitrary actions in a given situation according to the value of outcomes
of these actions, in order to optimise long-term pay-offs. Pavlovian RL
relates to a smaller set of often preparatory actions (e.g. approach or
avoid) which are ‘automatically’ elicited by features of the current si-
tuation that have reliably (e.g. during the species’ evolutionary history)
predicted the value of the next situation. Thus, a current situation that
includes the appearance of a prey item and hence predicts food intake,
automatically elicits approach behaviour. This may be the case even if
the appropriate response in that particular circumstance is to move
away or perform a detour (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Jones et al.,
2017). Despite the apparent ‘hard-wired’ nature of these Pavlovian re-
sponses, changes in how the current situation predicts the value of the
next situation can be learnt leading, for example, to Pavlovian re-
sponses to previously neutral cues.
Model-free (habitual) and model-based (goal-directed) control:
Computationally, RL decisions can be achieved using model-free or
model-based control. In model-based (goal-directed) control a model of
the world is simulated, for example as a decision-tree predicting how
actions at different decision-points will lead to transitions from one
situation to the next. The tree must be searched to establish which
actions and associated outcomes optimise long-term future gains.
Specific outcomes of decisions are represented (e.g. whether food X or
food Y will be acquired at the end of a decision sequence). This allows
their current value to be evaluated (e.g. I am full of food X so it is less
valuable at present) and decisions made accordingly. Model-based
control is thus flexible and rapidly adaptable to new circumstances.
However, as the decision-tree acquires more branches, prospective si-
mulation of decision outcomes rapidly becomes cognitively and com-
putationally demanding and so the efficacy of model-based control is
tightly constrained by limitations in information processing and
working memory capacity (Bach and Dayan, 2017; Dayan and Berridge,
2014; Dayan and Daw, 2008; Dickinson, 1985; Dickinson and Balleine,
1994; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). In humans, model-based control
equates to conscious reflection about two or more options that one
might take, where they may lead, what might be done next, and what
the eventual outcome is likely to be. In animals the underlying neural
processes may be similar but whether they are accompanied by the
conscious experience of future planning is unknown (e.g. Raby et al.,
2007).
Model-free (habitual) controllers dispense with the need for an in-
ternal model of the world and instead make decisions based on the
value of actions in the current situation, as determined by past ex-
perience. These values are (neurally) represented in memory as a form
of general utility but, unlike in model-based control, the specific out-
comes of the actions are not represented. In model-free control,
memory of how valuable an action was in the past determines deci-
sions, dispensing with the taxing forward simulation of model-based
control. Model-free control is thus computationally more efficient.
However, a lack of explicit representation of the decision outcome (e.g.
food X or food Y) means that any current devaluation of that outcome
(e.g. due to specific satiety) does not alter decisions until the new value
of the outcome is experienced. Model-free control is thus less flexible
and responsive to changes in current circumstances than model-based
control (Dickinson, 1985; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Dolan and
Dayan, 2013). Instrumental RL can involve both types of control. Al-
though Pavlovian RL has generally been assumed to involve model-free
control, model-based control may also play a role in certain circum-
stances (Dayan and Berridge, 2014). Neural substrates of model-based
and model-free control have been identified (Dolan and Dayan, 2013),
and one way of behaviourally discriminating between the two is to
determine whether current devaluation of decision outcomes alters
decisions appropriately (model-based) or not (model-free) (Dickinson,
1985; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994).
We now combine the above principles from reinforcement learning
theory with our operationalized definition of core affect to provide an
account of the interplay between affect and decision-making. The fra-
mework that we develop is particularly relevant to decision-making
under model-free control but we suggest how it may be extended to
model-based control in Section 5.6. We illustrate our framework using
the example of a rat moving through its environment and making de-
cisions (Fig. 3).
5.2. An animal’s situation comprises elements including its internal status,
memories, affective coding of past reward and punishment, and incoming
sensory information
The rat’s situation at any one time can be conceptualised as com-
prising a number of elements that are forms of neutrally-encoded in-
formation and are illustrated in the grey box in Fig. 3. Information
about its current internal status is provided by variables such as blood
sugar level, body temperature, and hormone levels; in our example,
blood sugar levels are low. Information about its external environment
is provided by incoming sensory information from the current environ-
ment; here, a predatory snake is about to appear. The rat also carries
memories of situations. These memories are from the individual’s own
past, but also include ‘evolutionary memory’ of cues and scenarios that
reliably predicted fitness-enhancing or threatening outcomes during the
species’ evolutionary history and which are associated with the ex-
pression of appropriate Pavlovian actions such as approach or avoid.
A fourth type of information is affectively coded as it pertains to the
rat’s recent history of success or failure at acquiring reward or avoiding
punishment. We propose that this is coded as a mood-like ‘baseline’ or
‘resting’ location in core-affect space, embodied as activation or deac-
tivation of Reward Acquisition (RAS) and Punishment Avoidance
Systems (PAS), or inverse activation thresholds (cf. Mendl et al., 2010;
Nettle and Bateson, 2012; Trimmer et al., 2013). In our example, the rat
has recently been through some tough times with little to eat and fre-
quent encounters with predators. Consequently, its mood-like core affect
state comprises an activated (or low response threshold) PAS and a
deactivated (or high response threshold) RAS similar to that depicted in
Fig. 2B and generating an overall PUN-H state.
We now illustrate how these elements of the rat’s situation combine
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to guide a sequence of decision-making events as depicted in Fig. 3,
with the horizontal axis representing time.
5.3. Prediction and detection of new incoming sensory information is
influenced by the animal’s situation
We propose that information about the rat’s current internal status
and its history of reward and punishment in the external environment
gives it a basis for estimating, respectively, the value and probability of
subsequent situations or action outcomes. In our example, the rat’s low
blood sugar levels enhance the value, or rewarding properties, of out-
comes that are associated with energy-rich food. This parallels the
notions of motivation and incentive salience whereby choice of actions
and how strongly they are performed relates to the animal’s need for
the associated outcome (Berridge, 2007, 2012; Berridge et al., 2009;
Cabanac, 1992; Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Niv et al., 2006; Rolls,
2005). At the same time, we propose that the rat’s PUN-H mood-like
core affect state predicts increased likelihood of negatively-valenced
outcomes such as predators or competitors in the environment; based
on recent past experience, the rat expects more bad than good things to
happen (Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and Bateson, 2012; Trimmer et al.,
2013).
Because the rat’s situation includes predictions and valuations of
subsequent situations, the arrival and interpretation of sensory in-
formation is not a purely passive process. New information, for example
cues predicting potential reward or punishment, may thus generate a
prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997). Expectation violations and sur-
prise are often associated with increased arousal and alertness and the
recruitment of attentional resources (Belova et al., 2007; Esber and
Haselgrove, 2011; Lee et al., 2006; Schomaker and Meeter, 2015). The
resulting increase in attention to the external environment is also in-
fluenced by predictions and is likely to be biased towards detecting cues
predicting danger due to the rat’s PUN-H mood-like core affect state
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Bethell et al., 2012b; Bradley et al., 1999; Lee
et al., 2016; Mogg et al., 1992). Attentional resources will also be di-
rected towards detecting food-related stimuli due to the rat’s low blood
sugar levels and associated motivation for food (Field et al., 2016;
Werthmann et al., 2013). These influences are illustrated by arrows
running from internal status and mood-like core affect to incoming sensory
information in Fig. 3, and are a form of internal action selection, in this
case deployment of attention. The perception of sensory information is
thus modulated through predictions. In this example, the incoming
information is pretty unambiguous – a dangerous snake – and the rat’s
PUN-H state likely facilitates its detection.
5.4. Action selection in unambiguous situations
5.4.1. Retrieved memories of similar situations provide information on the
value of different actions
The rat’s situation is now a combination of low blood sugar, a PUN-
H mood-like core affect state, and incoming sensory information in the
form of the appearance of a snake. The next stage of the decision
Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of the hypothesised role of core affect in model-free decision-making in unambiguous situations. A PUN-H mood-like core
affect state, low blood glucose internal status, andmemories of previous situations from the individual’s past or species’ evolutionary history, determine the
rat’s initial situation (grey box). Its mood-like state and internal status influence the deployment of attention (thick black and red arrows in the grey box) resulting in
the detection of new incoming sensory information, in this case a visual predator cue. The new situation is matched to memory of similar situations in the past.
Because the incoming sensory information is unambiguous, and hence likely to provide the basis for reliable prediction of outcomes, it has a stronger influence on
memory retrieval (thick dark green arrows) than mood-like core affect and internal status (thin black and red arrows in the grey box). The retrieved memory (dark
green box with black outline) is associated with actions previously taken in this situation, including evolved Pavlovian responses (ACTION OPTIONS, in this case
approach, avoid, ignore), and their outcomes (ACTION VALUES) which are coded in core affect space and represent AFFECTIVE OPTIONS. Through a core affect
comparison process, the action with the most positively-valenced affective option (avoid) is selected. This now becomes an AFFECTIVE PREDICTION (i.e. a
prediction of the affective consequence of the selected action in this situation). The PHYSICAL OUTCOME of this action is probabilistic (indicated by thickness of
arrows between selected action and outcome), and its associated AFFECTIVE OUTCOME is determined not just by direct experience of reward or punishment, but
also by their presence/absence in relation to the affective prediction. Physical outcomes feedback to influence internal status, whilst affective outcomes act as
prediction errors to update situation-dependent action values. They also update mood-like core affect. In core affect diagrams, grey dashed arrows denote RAS
and PAS, and red and green circles indicate, respectively, negatively and positively valenced states of these systems. Grey circles indicate a hypothetical integrated
location in core affect space (see Fig. 2). See text for a full description. Line drawings by Elsa Mendl.
M. Mendl and E.S. Paul Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 112 (2020) 144–163
150
process involves matching this situation to the most similar situation
held in memory. This is denoted by the arrow running between incoming
sensory information and individual / evolutionary memory of situations in
Fig. 3. Retrieval of the situation memory (green rectangle with a black
outline in Fig. 3) is assumed to bring with it associated information
about the benefits or otherwise of different actions taken in the past by
the rat in that situation. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 by the dashed arrows
leading from the retrieved memory to three potential actions (ACTION
OPTIONS). We suggest that information about the value of these actions
is coded as memories of the emotion-like core affect states generated by
rewarding or punishing outcomes of the actions in corresponding si-
tuations in the individual’s and evolutionary past. These ACTION VA-
LUES are shown in the centre of Fig. 3 as core affect locations alongside
each action.
5.4.2. Memories of emotion-like core affect states resulting from different
actions are compared via an affective common currency to identify the most
beneficial action in the current situation
Here we consider three ACTION OPTIONS – approach, avoid, ignore –
which have relevance in both instrumental and Pavlovian contexts.
Although we give these behavioural labels, each action comes with a set
of preparatory physiological actions including, for example, activation
of sympathetic-adrenomedullary and hypothalamic-pituitary adrenal
‘stress’ systems – physiological arousal – to mobilise resources ready for
active responses. Whether these physiological actions are set in train
when ACTION OPTIONS are retrieved (cf. Bechara and Damasio, 2005),
or only when an action is selected requires experimental investigation.
Each ACTION OPTION is associated with an ACTION VALUE. In the
past in this situation, approach has resulted in a PUN-H emotion-like
state due to an attack or chase, avoid has usually resulted in a transient
PUN-L state, although occasionally a PUN-H state occurs (e.g. due to a
chase), and ignore has generally resulted in a PUN-H state, although
occasionally a PUN-L state may occur (e.g. if the predator fails to detect
the rat). These action values can be thought of as AFFECTIVE OPTIONS
which must be resolved through some form of core affect comparison
process (Fig. 3) to identify the most beneficial action.
Such a process requires that core affect acts as a common currency
or common scaling allowing comparison of action values across func-
tionally distinct domains (cf. Cabanac, 1992; McFarland and Sibly,
1975; McNamara and Houston, 1986). The notion that affect plays such
a role in decision-making was put forward by Cabanac (1992, 2002)
who argued that the valenced-currency of ‘pleasure’ underpins deci-
sion-making. Cabanac and colleagues showed that both humans and
rats made decisions based on trade-offs between physiological (e.g.
water need, cold challenge) and non-physiological (e.g. sweet taste and,
in humans, video gaming) outcomes in an additive way and that, in
people, these choices were predicted by reports of (dis)pleasure (e.g.
Balasko and Cabanac, 1998; Cabanac and Johnson, 1983; Johnson and
Cabanac, 1982). Other studies further demonstrated that humans and
rats would work for stimulation of certain brain regions (e.g. septal
area) which humans reported as pleasurable, and would work harder
for higher stimulation rates. Shizgal and Conover (1996) showed that
hungry rats would trade off the value of sucrose reward against in-
creasing brain stimulation rate additively, and proposed that the sti-
mulated brain areas may thus be a neural substrate of an affective
common currency. In humans at least, it thus appears that processing of
affective information during decision-making may at least sometimes
be conscious, but non-conscious ‘automatic’ implementation is also
likely to occur (cf. Bechara and Damasio, 2005). The role of con-
sciousness in a common-currency comparison process in animals re-
mains unknown.
If, as argued, core affect provides a common currency for decision-
making, we propose that valence determines which action is selected, in
line with pleasure and reward maximisation ideas, and arousal influ-
ences the vigour and timing (speed, latency) of actions (Bach and
Dayan, 2017; Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Carver, 2001; Trimmer et al.,
2013). The result of the core affect comparison process is to reduce the
affective options to one SELECTED ACTION VALUE which becomes an
AFFECTIVE PREDICTION of the outcome of that action. In this case as
indicated in Fig. 3, avoid has the most positively-valenced action value,
likely due to a combination of the individual’s own past experiences,
and evolved Pavlovian avoid or freeze responses to cues predicting
punishment (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014). If the rat’s situation included a
reliable prey cue as opposed to predator cue, approach would become
the selected action because in the past it likely resulted primarily in a
REW-H emotion-like state and hence would have a more positively-
valenced action value than avoid or ignore.
The whole decision-making process, from detecting incoming in-
formation to action selection, may happen extremely rapidly or take
several seconds (Knutson and Greer, 2008) depending on factors such as
the number of previous situations to which the current situation is si-
milar, the number of available actions, the number of previously ex-
perienced outcomes in these situations, and the extent to which one
outcome is clearly more rewarding than all others. In neural terms, this
process has parallels with competitive interactions between neural re-
presentations of external information for control of action output in a
two-alternative forced-choice task (e.g. Platt and Glimcher, 1999), ex-
cept that here internal information from memory is involved and there
may be many more than two available options. Such processes can be
simulated by drift-diffusion and race models of decision-making (Hales
et al., 2016; Trimmer et al., 2008) with elaboration for multiple choices
(Bogacz, 2007; Bogacz et al., 2006). In a meta-analysis of human fMRI
studies, Knutson and Greer (2008) searched for neural correlates of
affective processes occurring during decision-making and found that
enhanced activation in nucleus accumbens was associated with antici-
pating reward (monetary gains), reporting high arousal positively-va-
lenced affect, and selecting high-risk or approach behaviour. In con-
trast, anterior insula activation increased during both monetary gain
and loss anticipation, was correlated with reported high arousal posi-
tive and negative affect, and preceded low-risk or avoidance actions.
5.4.3. Selected action values may vary in the certainty of their affective
predictions
Selected action values and affective predictions will vary according
to how reliably the associated action has led to a specific outcome in
recent similar situations. In the example in Fig. 3, the selected action
avoid, although the best option available, has had mixed success in the
past and has an action value that is intermediate between PUN-H and
PUN-L. However, for other individuals, avoid may have nearly always
resulted in escape from a predator and will thus have a clear PUN-L
action value. The former type of action value will yield a more un-
certain affective prediction that incorporates both PUN-H and PUN-L
states and this may initiate or maintain (physiological) arousal and
vigour in preparation for an uncertain outcome (Knutson and Greer,
2008). In contrast, the latter type may induce a PUN-L affective pre-
diction consistent with the observation that fear-like behaviours in the
presence of a cue predicting punishment attenuate during successful
avoidance learning (Starr and Mineka, 1977). Some argue that un-
certainty of predictions may itself generate a negatively valenced state
(Clark et al., 2018; see Section 6.6).
5.4.4. Mood-like core affect and internal status can influence the decision
process
Whilst the rat’s situation as a whole determines action values, it is
possible to envisage the influence of internal status and mood-like core
affect by considering likely action values if these changed. For example,
the relative value of avoid would increase further in a rat with higher
blood sugar levels and less immediate need for food. In terms of mood-
like core affect, because a PUN-H state will likely be associated with a
frequently threatening environment in which avoidance has been more
beneficial than approach, it influences action values in favour of avoid.
Mood-like state also influences the overall valence of the current
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situation per se, in this case making it more negative, and hence pre-
disposes valence-specific Pavlovian action (in this case, avoid). It fol-
lows therefore that a change to a REW-H mood-like state would lead to
a relative increase in the value of approach. However, influences of
mood-like state and internal status are likely to be small when the si-
tuation includes an unambiguous predator cue, is clearly dangerous,
and hence provides the basis for reliable prediction of outcomes. To
reflect this, the arrows running to memory of situations from internal
status and mood-like core affect state in Fig. 3 are thinner than that
coming from incoming sensory information, indicating the relatively
stronger influence of the latter.
5.4.5. The selected action has both physical and affective outcomes
Once selected, the rat’s action has a probabilistic PHYSICAL
OUTCOME which, in this case, can be successful avoidance (safety) or,
for example, injury (punishment) due to inefficient avoidant action.
Physical outcomes generate a change in internal status via feedback
mechanisms (feedback to internal status in Fig. 3). For example, energy
consumption due to fleeing will decrease blood sugar levels. The rat’s
action also has an AFFECTIVE OUTCOME (Fig. 3) influenced both by
the physical presence or absence of reward or punishment, and also by
the preceding action value prediction. In this case successful avoidance
would result in an emotion-like PUN-L state, whilst injurious punish-
ment would lead to an emotion-like PUN-H state. The latter outcome is
unexpected and surprising relative to the affective prediction that
guided action selection and is referred to as a prediction error (e.g.
Schultz et al., 1997; Fig. 3). In accord with model-free reinforcement
learning theory, this acts as a feedback or learning signal about the
success or otherwise of the decision made and updates action values
associated with the current situation (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972;
Sutton and Barto, 1998). In this case, an unexpected punishing outcome
would increase the PUN-H weighting of the avoid action value, and
hence increase uncertainty of future predictions of this action’s likely
outcome. In contrast, successful avoidance in line with the affective
prediction would have a smaller updating effect. It has been suggested
that the difference between affective prediction and affective outcome
may be a particularly potent determinant of conscious emotional ex-
periences in people (Eldar et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2014), perhaps
because expectation violations and surprise generate arousal
(Schomaker and Meeter, 2015) and signal new information that needs
to be attended to and learned.
In addition to these prediction error effects, we propose that short-
term emotion-like affective outcomes have another function which is to
update mood-like core affect (Fig. 3). This follows from our operational
definition that mood-like states are determined by cumulative experi-
ence of rewarding and punishing events. For example, a PUN-L (safe)
outcome would generate a small shift in the rat’s mood-like state away
from PUN-H.
5.5. Action selection in ambiguous situations
In the wild, there are likely to be many situations in which the
nature of incoming sensory information is uncertain and ambiguous
and yet the individual’s survival may depend on it making the correct
decision. For example, a rustle in the grass bears some similarity to both
reliable predator and prey cues, but if the wrong decision is made the
animal risks missing out on a meal or becoming one. How does our
model tackle decision-making under ambiguity? Mendl et al. (2010)
proposed that long-term mood-like states play a particularly important
role and we now provide more detail on how this may actually work
within a decision-theory framework.
As discussed, the rat’s PUN-H mood-like core affect state is likely to
bias attention towards detecting threat, whilst its low blood sugar levels
will direct attentional resources towards detecting food-related stimuli
(arrows running from mood-like core affect state and internal status to
incoming sensory information in the left-hand grey box of Fig. 4). Because
a rustle in the grass shares some stimulus properties with both threat
and food cues, our rat is more likely to detect the rustling noise than a
rat who is satiated and has a more neutral mood-like state.
The detected stimulus updates the rat’s situation to one which
shares the characteristics of a number of different situations held in
memory. Three such ‘memories’ are illustrated with a black outline in
the left-hand grey box of Fig. 4; a lighter green fill-colour indicates
association of the memory with a higher likelihood of rewarding out-
comes and darker green with a higher likelihood of punishing out-
comes. On its own, the incoming sensory information is insufficient to
discriminate between these different situations held in memory, but the
additional information provided by the rat’s mood-like core affect state
and internal status can facilitate this discrimination (thick red arrow
leading from mood-like core affect to memory of situations in right-hand
grey box in Fig. 4).
Assuming that the rat’s current PUN-H mood-like state reflects an
environment that has been stably and reliably characterised by frequent
threat and punishment in the past, it will likely have been in a PUN-H
mood-like state during recent encounters with ambiguous stimuli, and
these situations will have been associated with a high probability of
punishment. Consequently, the rat will match its current ‘PUN-H am-
biguous’ situation with memories of recent ‘PUN-H ambiguous’ situa-
tions (dark green ‘memory’ selected in right-hand grey box in Fig. 4). In
these situations avoid actions were primarily associated with positively-
valenced PUN-L states, and only occasionally with REW-L states when
the rustle presaged food, approach actions usually resulted in PUN-H
emotion-like states, and ignore had purely negative consequences re-
sulting from being attacked (PUN-H) or occasionally missing out on a
reward (REW-L). These are the affective options shown in Fig. 4.
Moreover, because the PUN-H mood-like state makes the overall va-
lence of the situation more negative, it also predisposes valence-specific
Pavlovian actions, in this case avoid. Through both instrumental and
Pavlovian processes, the PUN-H mood-like core affect state thus effec-
tively acts as a Bayesian prior for the likelihood of different action
outcomes under ambiguity and, in this scenario, favours avoid beha-
viour (the affective prediction in Fig. 4).
Such effects are well known from studies showing that people in
negative affective states make more negative or pessimistic judgements
about ambiguity (e.g. Mathews and MacLeod, 1994; Mineka et al.,
1998) and, more recently, that non-humans animals exhibit a similar
relationship between affect and decision-making under ambiguity (e.g.
Baciadonna and McElligott, 2015; Bethell, 2015; Clegg, 2018; Gygax,
2014; Hales et al., 2014; Harding et al., 2004; Mendl et al., 2009;
Neville et al., 2020; Paul et al., 2005; Roelofs et al., 2016). Our analysis
from a model-free reinforcement learning perspective suggests that
there may be similarities between the process by which mood-like core
affect exert its effects and the phenomenon of mood state-dependent
memory in which memories encoded when an individual is in a parti-
cular affective state are more readily retrieved when they are subse-
quently in the same state (Eich, 1995; Eich and Macaulay, 2000;
Thorley et al., 2016; Xie and Zhang, 2018). Thus, the rat’s current PUN-
H mood-like state enhances retrieval of action values from past am-
biguous situations that have also been associated with a PUN-H state
and hence, assuming some cross-time consistency in the environment,
with danger.
In addition to the influence of mood-like states, the rat’s low blood
sugar internal status enhances the value of food acquisition outcomes
and hence, on its own, favours Pavlovian approach responses related to
reward acquisition (Dayan and Berridge, 2014). This could occur
through enhancement of the value of the current situation hence pre-
disposing ‘automatic’ Pavlovian selection of approach, or it may be that
an evolutionarily programmed Pavlovian policy favouring approach is
implemented when blood sugar levels are low.
The conflict between internal status and mood-like core affect may
be resolved by the rat’s recent history. Whilst its internal status (e.g.
blood sugar level) may have been different on different ambiguous
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occasions because such states change on short time scales, its longer-
term core affect is likely to have been more consistently associated with
such situations, at least in temporally autocorrelated environments
(Nettle and Bateson, 2012). If so, the combination of PUN-H, internal
status, and stimulus ambiguity will favour avoid as described above,
and this is depicted in the right-hand grey box of Fig. 4 by the arrow
running to memory of situations from mood-like core affect being thicker
than those coming from internal status and incoming sensory information.
However, if the rat has only recently entered a PUN-H mood-like state,
then its blood sugar internal status will have a relatively greater impact
on its decision. These arguments indicate that the longer lasting a
mood-like core affect state, the greater its relative influence on deci-
sion-making, especially under ambiguity, although this will depend on
the precise autocorrelation structure of the environment (e.g. the longer
it has been winter, the higher the probability of a change to spring).
5.6. Extension of the framework to model-based control
Our framework has focused on model-free (habitual) control of
decisions based on memories of situation-specific action values without
any representation of what the actions achieve. In contrast, model-based
(goal-directed) control involves simulated predictions of exactly what
will be achieved, combined with information about the likelihood and
value of achieving it. Fig. 5 shows how our framework might be im-
plemented for model-based decision-making. For illustrative purposes
we show an unambiguous prey cue – a grasshopper (food X). As in the
model-free case, internal status and mood-like core affect combine to
influence attention and the consequent detection of incoming sensory
information which is then matched to similar situations in memory, in
this case encounters with grasshopper prey (left hand grey box of
Fig. 5). However once the closest matching memory has been retrieved,
model-based processing involves prospectively searching (in working
memory) a decision-tree representation of potential chains of actions
and their outcome identities, associated with the retrieved memory
(right hand shaded box of Fig. 5).
So, for example, approach-chase has been the most successful se-
quence in the past, followed by approach-stalk, then avoid-detour to-
wards prey (e.g. because this lulls prey into a false sense of security),
ignore-detour, and then avoid-continue foraging for other prey and ignore-
continue foraging. In addition to these AFFECTIVE OPTIONS the deci-
sion-tree model also represents decision OUTCOME IDENTITIES. For
example, the continue foraging options, although relatively unsuccessful,
sometimes result in catching another prey type (food Y). Prospective
search of the model identifies the best option which becomes an AFF-
ECTIVE PREDICTION & OUTCOME IDENTITY PREDICTION, in this
case approach-chase to get food X.
As in the model-free case, when cues are unambiguous, internal
status and mood-like core affect have relatively minor influences on the
retrieval of memories of situations. However, they can have a stronger
effect on decision-tree predictions. This can be illustrated through the
phenomenon of specific-satiety in which the rat’s current internal status
influences the value of different food types. If the rat has recently eaten
and hence is satiated on food X, this will be devalued relative to food Y.
Because the identity of decision outcomes is represented in model-based
control, the rat’s internal status can immediately update the value of
different outcomes according to their current utility. In this case, the
continue foraging options will become more highly valued because they
lead to acquisition of food Y rather than food X, and this may alter the
decision made. This effect is indicated by the arrow leading from in-
ternal status to the decision-tree model. It of course depends on internal
status carrying information about which foods have been eaten, as
empirically demonstrated in specific-satiety studies (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998; Correia et al., 2007; Kringelbach et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2000). Model-free processes, lacking decision outcome
identities, cannot implement such changes prospectively.
In ambiguous situations, mood-like core affect and internal status
Fig. 4. Schematic illustration of the hypothesised role of core affect in model-free decision-making in ambiguous situations. (A) A PUN-H mood-like core
affect state, low blood glucose internal status, and memories of previous situations from the individual’s past or species’ evolutionary history determine the
rat’s initial situation (grey box). Its mood-like state and internal status influence the deployment of attention (thick black and red arrows in the grey box) resulting in
the detection of new incoming sensory information, in this case an ambiguous rustle in the grass. Because this incoming information shares stimulus properties
with a range of situations, it is matched to memories of a number of such situations (three green boxes with black outlines). (B) Where incoming sensory information
is ambiguous, mood-like core affect and internal status provide additional information which can help to discriminate between the situations held in memory. In this
case, mood-like core affect has a particularly strong effect favouring retrieval of memories of ambiguous situations in which decision-outcomes tended to be negative
(thick red arrow in the grey box and dark green box with black outline). Consequently, the associated actions and AFFECTIVE OPTIONS favour selection of avoid
behaviour, as described in Fig. 3. In core affect diagrams, grey dashed arrows denote RAS and PAS, and red and green circles indicate, respectively, negatively and
positively valenced states of these systems. Grey circles indicate a hypothetical integrated location in core affect space (see Fig. 2). See text for a full description. Line
drawings by Elsa Mendl.
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may influence retrieval of memory of situations as described for model-
free decision-making, and hence influence decisions in this way.
However, it is possible that they also influence decision-tree searching.
In humans this process likely involves deliberative conscious simulation
of information in working memory, one piece of relevant information
being the person’s current mood which can sway the outcome of
working memory simulations in one direction or another, especially
when predictions are uncertain. For example, effects of moods on
human decision-making may involve some overall assessment of po-
tential decision outcomes that is coloured by mood (e.g. ‘how do I feel
about it?’ Gasper and Clore, 1998; Schwarz and Clore, 1983, 2003). It is
possible that this effect on the prospective search process, as opposed to
the memory retrieval process, also occurs in animals during model-
based decision-making and underpins some empirical findings of affect-
induced changes in animal decision-making under ambiguity (Harding
et al., 2004). Such a ‘high-level’ deliberative effect might conceivably
Fig. 5. Schematic illustration of the hypothesised role of core affect in model-based decision-making in unambiguous situations. Through the same pro-
cesses as detailed in Fig. 3 and represented in the left-hand grey box, the rat detects unambiguous incoming sensory information (in this case a visual prey cue) and
retrieves a memory of similar situations from its individual past / the species’ evolutionary history. The retrieved memory (light green box with black outline) is
associated with a decision-tree model of (sequences of) actions and the identities of their outcomes in similar scenarios (grey-shaded box). By prospectively searching
this model of AFFECTIVE OPTIONS and OUTCOME IDENTITIES the animal can evaluate the best option which becomes the AFFECTIVE PREDICTION & OUT-
COME IDENTITY PREDICTION, in this case approach-chase to acquire food X. Internal status can influence the decision-tree process as indicated by the thick black
arrow leading to the decision tree. For example, if the rat is specifically-satiated by recently consumed food X, this will bias decisions in favour of those with a food Y
outcome. Mood-like core affect can also exert an influence, but this will be most evident under ambiguous situations (hence the thin red arrow leading to the
decision-tree in this unambiguous situation) where a PUN-H state may colour evaluation of the options on offer in favour of those which minimise negative outcomes
such as encounter with a predator. In core affect diagrams, grey dashed arrows denote RAS and PAS, and red and green circles indicate, respectively, negatively and
positively valenced states of these systems. Grey circles indicate a hypothetical integrated location in core affect space (see Fig. 2). See text for a full description. Line
drawings by Elsa Mendl and Michael Mendl.
Fig. 6. Loewenstein & Lerner’s (2003) emotion and decision-making schema including corresponding constructs from our model. In Loewenstein and
Lerner’s (2003) schema, immediate emotions during decisions correspond to our notion of AFFECTIVE OPTIONS. They are moderated by incidental influences,
including moods and other aspects of the decision scenario, just as mood-like core affect and internal status influence affective options in our model. Immediate
emotions also influence expected consequences of a decision and their associated expected emotions which correspond to AFFECTIVE PREDICTION in our model.
Immediate and expected emotions determine the decision made, just as affective options and the resulting affective predictions determine the ACTION selected in our
model.
Adapted from Loewenstein and Lerner (2003).
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also take place during the core affect comparison process in model-free
decision-making (Figs. 3 and 4), but this is usually regarded as more
‘automatic’ and not requiring working memory resources or forward
simulations (Dayan and Daw, 2008; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Redish,
2015). The way in which mood-like states influence decisions may thus
depend on whether model-free or model-based control is in operation.
6. Implications, elaboration, caveats, and questions
We believe that our model offers a structured way of thinking about
how animal affective states influence decisions, which has relevance
across a broad range of species. It also identifies specific processes that
illuminate more general concepts alluded to in schema of the interplay
between human emotion and decision-making, including how different
sorts of affective state inter-relate.
Returning to Loewenstein & Lerner’s (2003) framework (Fig. 6), we
suggest that their notion of expected emotions corresponds to our AFF-
ECTIVE PREDICTION which incorporates an operationalized concept of
affect and provides a clear hypothesis for exactly how the properties of
core affect states can guide action selection and choice. In our model
the combined core affect locations of AFFECTIVE OPTIONS during the
core affect comparison process or decision-tree search may correspond
to Loewenstein & Lerner’s immediate emotions (see also: Bechara and
Damasio, 2005; Knutson and Greer, 2008). For example, in Fig. 3 this
would yield a largely high-arousal and negatively-valenced ‘anxiety-
like’ PUN-H dominated state that acts to prepare the rat for rapid vig-
orous action. Our model also proposes a role for incidental influences
such as ‘mood-like core affect’ and ‘internal status’ and shows exactly
how they can influence decision-making via effects on internal actions
such as attention, memory retrieval and decision-tree searches, and
how they are altered by decision outcomes to affect future choices.
Our model thus captures the key affective phenomena thought to
influence human-decision making and provides an explicit description
couched in modern decision-theory of exactly how they can be in-
tegrated to guide choices and action selection. Nevertheless, it in-
evitably has limitations and raises further theoretical and empirical
questions, some of which we now consider.
6.1. Limitations to the operational definition
The operational definition states that positive affect is induced by
stimuli or events (rewards) for which animals will work, and negative
affect by stimuli or events (punishers) that they will work to avoid
(Rolls, 2005). However, in certain circumstances there may be excep-
tions to this. For example, ‘wanting’ or motivation to access a stimulus
may sometimes dissociate from ‘liking’ of that stimulus, as during drug
addiction in which individuals work hard to get hold of drugs despite a
decrease in the reward that they derive from them (Berridge et al.,
2009). Animals may also sometimes voluntarily work to access stimuli
that are potentially dangerous, as during predator inspection
(Blaszczyk, 2017; Fitzgibbon, 1994; Humphrey, 1972; Humphrey and
Keeble, 1974), although involuntary encounter with a predator is un-
likely to induce positive affect and will be actively avoided. Thus, the
context in which work is observed, including the degree of control that
the subject has, may influence what the subject is prepared to work for
or avoid, and how hard. This is an empirical issue to bear in mind when
applying the operational definition to identify rewards and punishers. A
related methodological issue is that it may be difficult to measure how
hard animals will work to actively avoid a punisher. This is because
evolved Pavlovian predispositions to perform specific actions in parti-
cular situations may favour freezing rather than active instrumental
responses to dangerous stimuli (e.g. Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Jones
et al., 2017).
A theoretical challenge is provided by the suggestion that the dif-
ference between anticipated reward / punishment and the actual reward
/ punishment received has a stronger influence on affective state than
the absolute levels of reward or punishment themselves. Thus, an in-
dividual’s ‘trajectory’ – whether it is doing better or worse than ex-
pected – could be an important determinant of, in particular, its long-
term affective state (e.g. humans: Eldar et al., 2016; Rutledge et al.,
2014). Empirical studies of animals are needed to investigate this
possibility, although an initial analysis failed to find supportive evi-
dence (Raoult et al., 2017).
Notwithstanding these issues, we believe that the operational defi-
nition has much to offer in providing a start-point for experimental
studies of animal affect.
6.2. Discrete vs dimensional models of emotion and model-free vs model-
based control
For reasons outlined earlier, our framework is grounded in a di-
mensional core affect model of emotion (Posner et al., 2005; Russell,
2003; Russell and Barrett, 1999) which posits that interplay between
core affect and contextual information can construct a range of specific
emotions (Barrett, 2017a, b). However, an alternative discrete emotions
model proposes that there are a number of basic emotional states –
happiness, fear, anger, sadness, disgust etc. – controlled by specific
neural circuits and characterised by a distinct set of behavioural, phy-
siological and subjective responses, and that these states are the
building blocks for all emotions (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992, 1999;
Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 1998, 2005).
Ongoing arguments concern which of these models most accurately
reflects how emotions arise and are coded in the brain (Adolphs, 2017;
Barrett, 2017b; Kragel and Labar, 2016; Lindquist et al., 2012). If both
have some veracity, another question is which has causal primacy? For
example does core affect, in combination with contextual information,
generate discrete emotions as constructionist theorists would argue
(e.g. Barrett, 2017a, b; Bliss-Moreau, 2017; Fig. 7A)? Or is there a
process by which the activation of ongoing discrete emotion systems is
integrated to generate an overall core affective valence and arousal
state (Fig. 7B)? Or is there some form of bidirectional relationship
(Izard, 2007; Mendl et al., 2010; Panksepp, 2007)? One possibility is
that interplay between discrete and dimensional systems allows the
former to be mapped to the common currency that the latter can pro-
vide, hence enabling it to generate action values. For example, ‘hap-
piness’ could map to REW-H space, ‘fear’ to PUN-H space, and ‘anger’ to
an intermediate or slightly positive high arousal location (Carver and
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Russell, 2003; Watson et al., 1999). In this way,
discrete emotion systems can be incorporated into the decision-making
schema that we have described.
It is also possible that different decision-making processes predis-
pose discrete emotion-like or core affect states. Bach and Dayan (2017)
suggest that the general utility metric in model-free control of re-
inforcement learning decisions has parallels with the common currency
of core affect. On the other hand model-based control, by representing
specific actions and outcomes, recruits distinct behavioural and phy-
siological responses that may engender discrete emotional states (Bach
and Dayan, 2017). In our model, core affect processes are viewed as
important in both model-free and model-based decision-making
(Figs. 3–5).
6.3. Arousal and vigour: the problem of low-arousal action values for
punishment avoidance
We have proposed that arousal, including enhanced attention and
activation of sympathetic-adrenomedullary and hypothalamic-pituitary
adrenal ‘stress’ systems, heightens in anticipation of reward or pun-
ishment, uncertainty of the outcomes of optimal actions, and/or in re-
sponse to prediction error and activation of Reward Acquisition or
Punishment Avoidance Systems resulting from such errors (cf. Esber
and Haselgrove, 2011; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Lee et al., 2006;
Schomaker and Meeter, 2015). Elevated arousal plays an important role
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in preparing the organism for vigorous action to acquire anticipated
rewards or avoid anticipated punishers (Boureau and Dayan, 2011;
Carver, 2001; Trimmer et al., 2013). A potential problem for our model
is that the core affect value of actions that avoid punishment are en-
visaged to lie in the low arousal PUN-L quadrant, whereas we would
expect that such actions are associated with high arousal and associated
vigour.
As mentioned earlier, our hypothesis is that valence determines
which action is selected whilst arousal determines the vigour of action
execution. If so, the arousal level of the action value which is most
positively-valenced (selected) may indeed be low (PUN-L). For ex-
ample, Starr and Mineka (1977) demonstrated a decrease in fear-like
behaviour in rats that had learnt actions that were reliably successful at
avoiding punishment, as long as feedback was given contingent on
these actions. In such circumstances, punishment avoidance will be
executed calmly and efficiently. In contrast, when the selected optimal
action is associated with variable and sometimes unsuccessful out-
comes, as in Fig. 3, its AFFECTIVE PREDICTION arousal level will be
higher and hence responses will be less calm and more vigorous (see
Section 5.4.3).
Our model also raises the possibility that changes in arousal are
initiated during the core affect comparison process before an action is
selected, and are influenced by the combined core affect locations of
AFFECTIVE OPTIONS. Since these options usually include actions
whose anticipated outcomes are rewarding and/or punishing, asso-
ciated activation of Reward Acquisition and/or Punishment Avoidance
Systems and elevated (physiological) arousal may be initiated whilst
the optimal action is being selected. This arousal may be maintained,
due to temporal inertia in physiological systems, and have an en-
ergising effect on the selected action, even if its action value is PUN-L.
Studies of the temporal dynamics of physiological changes during
the decision-making and action selection process (cf. Lang and Bradley,
2010; Lang et al., 2000) are needed to discriminate between the above
two explanations. In a recent experiment with chickens, Davies et al.
(2015) found that during decisions to approach either a high pay-off but
risky or low pay-off non-risky location, heart-rate changes did not
predict the decision made. However, following the decision they did
anticipate the riskiness of the selected outcome, in line with the first
explanation that variation in the predicted outcomes of a selected ac-
tion (AFFECTIVE PREDICTION) can influence arousal.
Another possibility is that there is a transient high arousal compo-
nent to both successful avoidance of punishment and thwarting of re-
ward acquisition. Studies of humans indicate that ‘relief’ can be an
invigorating and arousing state, and that ‘frustration’ in the face of
reward loss or acquisition failure is also arousing, for example leading
to anger (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones, 2004; Gatzke-Kopp et al.,
2015; van Well et al., 2019). Likewise, animal studies report enhanced
activity rates and even spontaneous aggression following the denial of
anticipated reward (Arnone and Dantzer, 1980; Dudley and Papini,
1997; Haskell et al., 2000; Roper, 1984; Waitt and Buchanan-Smith,
2001), and high arousal play behaviour when farm animals are released
from confined and barren spaces that may be both punishing (e.g.
discomfort; inability to avoid aggressive conspecifics) as well as lacking
in reward (Rushen and de Passillé, 2014). Such effects would alter the
mapping of Reward Acquisition and Punishment Avoidance Systems to
core affect (Fig. 2) by extending the former to include the PUN-H
quadrant and the latter to include the REW-H quadrant. These transient
core affect states would likely result in the action values of even reg-
ularly successful punishment avoidance actions having an enhanced
arousal component that could contribute to vigour of execution.
6.4. Are affective states the same during and following decisions?
As argued earlier, there is evidence that animals will work to access
or avoid not just biologically salient rewards and punishers (‘primary
reinforcers’: Rolls, 2005), but also their predictors, including second-
order cues. Following our operational definition, this means that af-
fective states can occur both in response to decision outcomes, but also
to predictors and hence during the decision-making process. One ob-
vious question is whether these states are exactly the same or whether
they differ in the way that they are coded according to their role and
sequence in the decision-making process. Loewenstein and Lerner
(2003), for example, propose that expected emotions (Fig. 1) are evoked
without conscious experience, whereas immediate emotions are con-
sciously experienced.
Dickinson and Balleine (2010) argued that action values occurring
during decisions (AFFECTIVE OPTIONS and PREDICTIONS; Fig. 3) are
coded in a different form to affective states occurring after a decision
outcome (AFFECTIVE OUTCOMES; Fig. 3). In an ingenious set of ex-
periments, they showed that rats recently trained to press a lever for a
Fig. 7. Core affect and discrete models of emotion. Differing views of the causal links between discrete emotions and core affect. (A) Advocates of constructionist
theories contend that discrete emotions arise when core affect combines with sensory and contextual information about the specifics of the current situation,
including its similarity to past events (e.g. Barrett, 2012, 2017b; Bliss-Moreau, 2017). (B) The contrary view is that discrete emotions are fundamental, and activation
of ongoing discrete emotion systems is integrated to generate an overall core affective valence and arousal state. A bi-directional relationship is also possible
(Panksepp, 2007; Mendl et al., 2010; Bach and Dayan, 2017). See text for details.
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food reward were sensitive to reward devaluation via a subsequent
independent experience involving pairing of the food with LiCl-induced
sickness. Following this experience, the rats reduced pressing when
reintroduced to the lever (measured in extinction) indicating model-
based (goal-directed) control of the behaviour. However, this deva-
luation was prevented if the rats were presented with an anti-emetic
alongside the LiCl, presumably by removing the affective impact of the
sickness.
If affective information is used in the same form during decision-
making as following action outcomes, then presenting an anti-emetic
just prior to / during a decision should also prevent devaluation effects;
rats with experience of LiCl induced sickness that has devalued the food
reward will not be able to re-experience this affective state during the
decision due to the anti-emetic. They should therefore press the lever
just as much as control animals who have not experienced reward de-
valuation. However, Balleine et al. (1995) found that this was not the
case and the rats who had experienced sickness pressed the lever less
indicating that affective information was in a different form during
decision-making compared to following an action outcome (Dickinson
and Balleine, 2010).
Our framework raises the additional possibility that the anti-emetic
specifically interferes with a discrete emotion representation of action
value (‘nausea’), whilst leaving a core affect action value (negativity)
intact and available to implement devaluation. Administering a drug
with more general valenced effects (e.g. an anxiolytic) during decision-
making would shed light on this possibility. If prevention of devalua-
tion during decision-making was then observed, this would suggest that
similar core affect processes were at play both during decision-making
and following a decision outcome.
6.5. Mood-like core affect: model and measurement
As we have described, mood-like core affect can have important
influences on decision-making and, because it encompasses depression-
like (REW-L) and anxiety-like (PUN-H) states, is itself of interest in
disciplines such as neuroscience, psychopharmacology and animal
welfare science. Accurate measurement of such states is therefore im-
portant, and a clear prediction of our model is that their effects on
decision-making are most readily revealed under ambiguity (Fig. 4). As
argued, animals in a negatively-valenced PUN-Hmood-like state should
favour punishment avoidance actions under ambiguity (operationally
defined as ‘pessimistic’) compared to those in a PUN-L state, whilst
animals in a positively-valenced REW-H state will favour reward
seeking actions (‘optimistic’) relative to those in a REW-L state. More
generally, positive valence will be associated with ‘optimistic’ decisions
under ambiguity and negative valence with ‘pessimistic’ decisions.
‘Optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ decision-making under ambiguity can
thus provide a window on mood-like states and we have developed a
test of such ‘cognitive’ or ‘judgement biases’ in which animals are trained
to make a ‘positive response’ (p: e.g. press right lever) to a ‘positive cue’
(P: e.g. tone of a particular frequency) to obtain a reward, and a ‘ne-
gative response’ (n: press left lever) to a ‘negative cue’ (N: tone of a
different frequency) to avoid punishment. Once trained, subjects re-
ceive occasional ambiguous cues (tones intermediate between P and N).
The prediction is that animals in a relatively negative affective state
make response n more often to these cues indicating anticipation of a
punishment – a ‘pessimistic’ decision – than animals in a more positive
state (Harding et al., 2004; Mendl et al., 2009).
Variants of this task have been used in over 100 published studies
on a variety of species. The majority support the predictions, but there
are also null and opposite results (for a recent meta-analysis, see Neville
et al., 2020). Some of these may be explained by a closer analysis of the
putative underlying processes suggested by the framework presented
here. For example, in the ambiguous situation of Fig. 4, the rat’s low
blood sugar internal status comes into conflict with its PUN-H mood-
like core affect state; the former favours an ‘optimistic’ approach
response by enhancing the value or incentive salience of reward whilst
the latter favours ‘pessimistic’ avoid behaviour. The balance between
these two may be determined by how long the animal has been in a
particular core-affect state, how autocorrelated the environment is and
hence how well mood-like core-affect predicts decision outcomes
(Nettle and Bateson, 2012), and how far internal status deviates from a
‘desired’ homeostatic balance. Different combinations of these factors
may explain some of the unpredicted findings in studies of judgement
bias. Their effects can be investigated more directly by including
measures of reward valuation or incentive salience alongside judge-
ment bias, or by using computational modelling of judgement bias data
to evaluate the influence of decision-making parameters such as a
subject’s estimation of reward value and probability (Iigaya et al.,
2016).
6.6. Mood-like core affect: relationship to short-term emotion-like states
An assumption of the model is that an individual’s history of short-
term emotion-like states (success or failure at acquiring reward /
avoiding punishment) leads to additive changes in longer-term mood-
like core affect. There is ample evidence that, for example, repeated
exposure to stressors can generate depression-like states in humans and
animals (Hammen, 2005; Kessler, 1997; McEwen, 2005; Rygula et al.,
2005). However, direct empirical study is needed to understand the
temporal dynamics of these effects, for example whether more recent
events are more heavily weighted than those in the past because they
are most likely to be better predictors of what will happen to the in-
dividual next.
Using judgement bias as a proxy indicator of mood-like core affect,
some studies do indeed find that recent short-term affect manipulations
have the predicted effects on decision-making under ambiguity (e.g.
Bethell et al., 2012a; Burman et al., 2009; Destrez et al., 2012; Neave
et al., 2013; Rygula et al., 2012; Saito et al., 2016). For example, Jones
et al. (2018) found that rats experiencing a high frequency of rewarding
events during the 15min preceding a judgement bias test made more
‘optimistic’ judgements of ambiguity than those experiencing a low
frequency of reward. On the other hand, other studies find opposite
effects which may result from the paradoxical induction of, for ex-
ample, PUN-L states when a short-term aversive stimulus is removed
prior to testing (e.g. Doyle et al., 2010; Sanger et al., 2011; see also
Burman et al., 2011).
To date, however, no study has systematically investigated how
different sequences and timing of rewarding and punishing events, with
differing temporal relationship to judgement bias tests, influence de-
cision-making under ambiguity. Such studies could generate novel in-
formation on how short-term emotions map to longer-term mood-like
states and whether it is the relative difference between anticipated and
actual reward or punishment – how the individual is doing relative to
expectations – or the absolute experience of each reward and punish-
ment that most strongly influences mood-like states (Carver, 2001;
Eldar et al., 2016; Franks et al., 2016; Franks and Higgins, 2012;
Higgins, 1997, 1998; Rutledge et al., 2014).
Another possibility is raised by Clark et al. (2018) who argue that
high uncertainty about decision outcomes leads to negatively-valenced
short-term emotions whilst positive emotions are associated with high
certainty about outcomes (see also Seth and Friston, 2016). They sug-
gest that moods reflect the long-term prediction of the certainty or
uncertainty of action outcomes. For example, depression reflects a
precise long-term prediction that action outcomes will be uncertain.
Such a hypothesis could be tested using judgement bias methods by
varying an animal’s experience of decision outcome certainty, and as-
suming that REW-L core affect reflects depression-like states.
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6.7. Domain specificity or generality: do reward Acquisition (RAS) and
Punishment Avoidance Systems (PAS) only influence decisions in the reward
or punishment domain respectively, and are there separate RAS and PAS for
different functional domains?
The question of whether the four fundamental affective states gen-
erated by long-term activation or deactivation of putative underlying
RAS and PAS have domain-specific effects is of interest as it can tell us
whether reward and punishment processes work separately or influence
each other (Carver, 2001; Leknes and Tracey, 2008; Norris et al., 2010;
Watson et al., 1999). The question can be investigated by exposing
animals to repeated success or failure at acquiring reward (REW-H / -L)
or avoiding punishment (PUN-H / -L). Judgement bias tasks can then be
used to test whether REW-H / -L states only influence ‘optimistic’ or
‘pessimistic’ responses in reward-based tasks, and PUN-H / -L states
only exert an influence in punishment-based tasks, or whether they
exert cross-domain influences. Although this question has not been a
specific focus of judgement bias studies, partly due to a lack of pun-
ishment-only based tasks, there are examples in which punishment-
related treatments lead to the predicted ‘pessimistic’ change in reward-
based tasks (e.g. Barker et al., 2016, 2017; Chaby et al., 2013; Hales
et al., 2016), but also those which find no such effect (e.g. Brydges
et al., 2012; Hernandez et al., 2015; Novak et al., 2016; Parker et al.,
2014). Double-dissociation studies are needed to address this issue
properly. Findings from trans-reinforcer blocking studies that a cue
predicting omission of food delivery can block learning about a new cue
predicting shock point to generalisation across, in this case, negatively-
valenced REW-L (RAS) and PUN-H (PAS) states (Dickinson and Dearing,
1979).
An assumption of our model is that there are unitary RAS and PAS
sensitive to, and hence integrating, reward and punishment histories
across many functional domains (e.g. competition for mates, foraging).
However, it is possible that there may also be domain-specific RAS and
PAS. This can be explored by varying an individual’s history of reward
and punishment in one functional domain and then testing it in a jud-
gement bias task in which reward is provided in a different domain to
see whether the predicted ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ response profile is
exhibited. Again, no judgement bias study has explicitly investigated
this question, but nearly all judgement bias tasks use food as a reward
and hence have relevance to a ‘foraging’ functional domain, whilst af-
fect manipulations are many and varied, including environmental en-
richment, unpredictable housing, restraint, social isolation, tempera-
ture changes, and others which are not directly related to foraging.
Many of these studies have found predicted effects on judgement bias,
suggesting that reward and punishment information from different
functional domains are integrated, perhaps into unitary RAS and PAS.
Double-dissociation studies are again needed to provide definitive
evidence.
From a theoretical perspective, unitary systems would seem more
likely in species whose behavioural and ecological niche predisposes
positive correlations within reward and punishment likelihoods across
functional domains, compared to those where reward or punishment in
one domain is not a good predictor of that in another. That being said,
Nettle and Bateson (2012) point out that the fact that it is the same
individual acting across contexts is itself an important source of cross-
domain autocorrelation. For example, when in poor condition an in-
dividual is likely to fare less well across contexts than when it is in
better condition. Moreover, ultimately there must be a way of drawing
together information, even if domain-specific, to allow a decision to be
made. Hence the concepts of common currency, competition between
neural pathways for control of motor output, and race or drift-diffusion
decision-making discussed earlier.
6.8. What about conscious experience of emotional feelings?
As we have emphasised, our framework does not address whether
affective states are consciously experienced or occur in the absence of
subjective feelings. In humans there is evidence that some physiological
and behavioural changes that characterise affective responses appear to
occur without conscious awareness (e.g. Smith and Lane, 2015, 2016;
Winkielman and Berridge, 2004; Winkielman et al., 2005). For ex-
ample, Winkielman and Gogolushko (2018) found that people pre-
sented with masked subliminal or supraliminal images of emotionally-
valenced happy or angry faces drank, respectively, more or less of a
sugary beverage, indicating an affectively-guided behavioural response
(consumption of a rewarding substance) which occurred in the absence
of any subjectively reported emotion. Given this dissociation between
subjective and other components of affect in humans it is quite possible
that, for example, long-term experience of reward and punishment in a
non-human species might generate a neurally-coded mood-like state
which functions without any accompanying conscious experience. The
finding that, in addition to mammalian and bird species, insects such as
bees show predicted judgement biases (Bateson et al., 2011; Deakin
et al., 2018; Perry et al., 2016; Schluns et al., 2016) is in line with the
notion that mood-like states have adaptive value in guiding decisions
that may be evident across a range of taxa, including those which many
assume are unlikely to be conscious or may have only rudimentary (e.g.
perceptual but not affective) forms of conscious experience (see Barron
and Klein, 2016; Mendl et al., 2010, 2011; Mendl and Paul, 2016; Nettle
and Bateson, 2012; Paul et al., 2020). These findings thus inform us
about the potential evolutionary origins and conservation of affective
processes across species (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; Mendl et al.,
2011; Mendl and Paul, 2016), but do not tell us about the conscious
experience of such processes.
One possibility is that there is a conscious component of neurally-
instantiated affective processes in some species but not others (Paul
et al., 2020; see: Key, 2016; Klein and Barron, 2016 and debates
therein). Separate studies of the existence of consciousness in non-
human animals are required to address this possibility (Boly et al.,
2013; Edelman et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Hampton, 2001;
Smith et al., 2003; van Vugt et al., 2018). An alternative idea is that
affective processes become consciously experienced in certain circum-
stances. These could include during surprising or unexpected events
which generate prediction errors between anticipated affect and af-
fective outcomes of decisions, a speculation that is supported by recent
work suggesting that the difference between the actual and predicted
outcome of a decision is a key determinant of reported subjective
happiness (Eldar et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2014). Another possibility
is that integration or binding of information from RAS and PAS gen-
erates neural signals that are broadcast widely across the brain for use
in decision-making (Dehaene, 2014), and result in conscious subjective
report of location in core affect space. Studies of human decision-
making that collect data on reported subjective experience should allow
us to identify which aspects of the interplay between affect and deci-
sion-making generate or require access to conscious emotional experi-
ence and which do not, and hence give further clues about the possible
functions of conscious as opposed to non-conscious affective processes.
7. Conclusions
Using a simple definition of animal affect which employs beha-
viourally operationalized concepts of reward and punishment and maps
to the dimensional core affect model, we propose a framework, rooted
in reinforcement learning theory, for conceptualising the role of affec-
tive processes in animal decision-making. This advances the frequently-
expressed idea that a major function of affective states is to organise
and guide behavioural choices, by providing a model of how affective
phenomena including AFFECTIVE OPTIONS, AFFECTIVE PREDICTION
and AFFECTIVE OUTCOMES underpin moment-to-moment decision
making, and how longer-term mood-like core affect provides context to
guide decisions. Although our framework is grounded in dimensional
models of affect, discrete emotion constructs can also be incorporated.
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Our framework generates a number of questions that require em-
pirical investigation as outlined in Section 6. Because it is based on an
underpinning operational definition of affect, it can be applied across
species allowing comparison of similarities and differences in affect-
related decision-making across taxa, and hence shedding light on ulti-
mate questions about the evolution and function of affective states. This
translatability also allows proximate mechanistic questions to be ad-
dressed in neurobiologically simpler species such as Drosophila where
there is already a good understanding of the neural substrates of reward
and punishment learning, a burgeoning interest in affective processes,
and candidate systems that have the potential to code a mood-like state
(Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; Aso et al., 2014; Deakin et al., 2018;
Perisse et al., 2013; Waddell, 2013).
In summary, we hope that the framework developed here provides a
formalised way of conceptualising the various types and functions of
animal affect in the context of decision-making, generates empirically
tractable questions of the sort outlined above, offers a structured ap-
proach to addressing these, and helps our thinking about the links be-
tween affect and decision-making in a way that is relevant and ap-
plicable across a broad range of taxa.
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